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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an aggregative model of total factor productivity (TFP) in the spirit of
Houthakker (1955—1956). It considers a frictional labor market where production units are sub-
ject to idiosyncratic shocks and jobs are created and destroyed as in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). An aggregate production function is derived by aggregating across micro production units
in equilibrium. The level of TFP is explicitly shown to depend on the underlying distribution of
shocks as well as on all the characteristics of the labor market as summarized by the job-destruction
decision. The model is also used to study the eﬀects of labor-market policies on the level of measured
TFP.
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ricardo.lagos@nyu.edu.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper focuses on the theory underlying the aggregate production function and shows how
labor-market policies can aﬀect this function in general and the level of measured total factor
productivity (TFP) in particular. Speciﬁcally, I construct an aggregative model of TFP in the
spirit of Houthakker (1955—1956): the basic idea is to derive an aggregate production function
by aggregating across active production units. In equilibrium, the levels of output, inputs, and
TFP, as well as the shape of the aggregate relationship between them, depend on individual
production decisions–such as which production units remain active in the face of idiosyncratic
shocks–and these decisions are, in turn, aﬀected by policies. In this way, the model can be
used to study the precise interaction between all these variables explicitly.
In the model proposed here, policy aﬀects TFP because the latter is related to the average
productivity of the units that are active, and policy induces changes in the productivity com-
position of active units. By distorting the way in which individual production units react to
the economic environment, labor-market policies can make an economy exhibit a low level of
T F P .A sar e s u l t ,t w oe c o n o m i e sm a ye x h i b i td i ﬀerent levels of TFP even if production units
in both have access to the same technology and are subject to identical shocks.
At a theoretical level, the paper also shows that, under some conditions, a standard search
model of the labor market–with its underlying meeting frictions and simple ﬁxed-proportions
micro-level production technologies–can generate an aggregate production function that looks
just like the one implied by the textbook neoclassical model of growth in which ﬁrms have access
to a standard constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production technology. So in this sense, from
the perspective of aggregate output, inputs, and productivity, the neoclassical and the search
paradigms can seem quite close. However, the search model implies a diﬀerent mapping between
the parameters of the aggregate production technology and observables, and this feature can
be relevant for growth accounting exercises.
At a conceptual level, the paper is related to the vast literature that documents and triesto explain diﬀerences in TFP levels across countries. Examples include Hall and Jones (1999),
Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), and Parente and Prescott (2000). In terms of explanations,
this literature shares the basic idea that the level of an economy’s TFP is determined by the
quality of its “institutions.” Hall and Jones (1999) argue that diﬀerences in observed TFP
are driven by diﬀerences in the institutions and government policies they collectively refer
to as “social infrastructure.” Corrupt government oﬃcials, severe impediments to trade, poor
contract enforcement, and government interference in production are some of their examples of
bad social infrastructures that could lead to low levels of TFP.
Parente and Prescott (1994) propose that some countries have lower TFP than others be-
cause their process of technology adoption at the micro level is constrained by “barriers to
riches.” These barriers are essentially any institution or government policy that increases the
cost of technology adoption. From that perspective, this paper can be thought of as adding
labor-market policies to the list of institutions that aﬀect the level of TFP.1
The paper is also related to the large body of work that tries to account for diﬀerences
in macroeconomic performance, usually employment rates and labor productivity, with dif-
ferences in labor-market policies, typically unemployment beneﬁts or employment protection.
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Millard and Mortensen (1997),
Restuccia and Rogerson (2004), and Veracierto (2001) are some examples of this line of work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. The equilib-
rium is characterized in Section 3. In Section 4, an aggregation result similar in spirit to the
classic contribution of Houthakker (1955—1956) is derived for a canonical dynamic equilibrium
search economy. This section also shows how, when aggregate inputs are measured appropri-
1Unlike Hall and Jones (1999), Parente and Prescott (2000), or Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), this paper
is not about development economics, in the sense that it does not attempt to explain why some countries are
30 times richer than others in per-capita terms. The emphasis on labor-market institutions makes the analysis
more relevant to study productivity diﬀerences among a relatively homogeneous set of countries (or sectors). For
example, Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) report productivity diﬀerences among
OECD countries, with France and Italy having a higher level of TFP and Germany a much lower level relative to
the United States. These observations may seem striking, especially given the conventional wisdom that France
and Italy have distorted labor markets vis-à-vis the United States. These are examples of the types of questions
that the model developed here is well suited to address.
2ately, the level of TFP depends on all the characteristics of the labor market summarized by the
job-destruction decisions. Section 5 introduces four policies–employment subsidies, hiring sub-
sidies, ﬁring taxes, and unemployment beneﬁts–and studies their eﬀects on TFP. Section 6 puts
the theoretical results of the previous sections into perspective. Section 6.1 explains the simi-
larities and diﬀerences between the aggregation result obtained in Section 4 and Houthakker’s
contribution, and relates the general approach to the literature on aggregation of production
functions that dates back to the late 1940’s. Since empirically, the level of TFP is measured as
a residual, it depends critically on the measurement of the inputs of production. Section 6.2
discusses some of these measurement issues and uses the theory to study their implications for
the nature of the TFP residual. Section 6.3 draws some connections to the standard growth
accounting exercises. In Section 7, a calibrated version of the model is used to quantify the
eﬀects of labor-market policies on the level of TFP. Section 8 extends the basic model to allow
for serially correlated shocks and state-dependent destruction rates, and it generalizes the main
aggregation result. Section 9 concludes. All propositions are proven in Appendix A. Appendix
B contains additional extensions and some auxiliary results.
2T h e M o d e l
The labor market is modeled as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).2 Time is continuous and
the horizon inﬁnite. There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents of two types: workers and
ﬁrms. Both types are risk-neutral. The size of the labor force is normalized to unity, whereas the
number of ﬁrms will be determined endogenously by free entry. Workers derive utility from con-
sumption and–in one of the speciﬁcations developed below–also suﬀer disutility from working.
2There are at least three reasons for carrying out the analysis in a search and matching framework. First, as
will be discussed in Section 5, the labor-market policies considered will have testable implications not only for
the level of TFP but also for the unemployment rate and the job-creation and job-destruction rates. Second, an
explicit treatment of unemployment is relevant because–as will be shown in Sections 6 and 7–the unemployment
rate will aﬀect empirical measures of TFP for the ways of measuring aggregate inputs that can be found in
the literature. And ﬁnally, this framework has already been used extensively to analyze the eﬀects of similar
policies on many other aggregate labor-market outcomes (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000, Pissarides, 2000,
and references therein).
3Each ﬁrm has a single job that can be either ﬁlled or vacant and searching. Similarly, workers
can be either employed by a ﬁrm or unemployed and searching. No new oﬀers arrive while an
agent is in a relationship. I abstract from capital accumulation and assume an exogenous rental
rate of capital, c. The aggregate stock of capital, K, will be determined by demand.3
Assume meeting frictions can be represented by a function m(u,v) that determines the
instantaneous number of meetings as a function of the numbers of searchers on each side of the
market, namely, unemployed workers u and vacancies v.S u p p o s em exhibits constant returns
to scale and is increasing in both arguments. Let q(θ) denote the (Poisson) rate at which a
vacancy contacts an unemployed worker, with θ = v/u.4
Each ﬁrm has access to a technology f (x,n,k) that combines the hours supplied by the
worker it employs, n,a n dc a p i t a l ,k, to produce a homogeneous consumption good. The match-
speciﬁc productivity level is stochastic and indexed by the random variable x. I assume that
f (x,n,k)=xmin(n,k) (1)
and interpret k as the ﬁrm’s capacity or scale of operation. Thus, output is linear in hours but
is bounded above by the stock of capital the ﬁrm is operating with. The convention is that
the technology is such that all projects have the same scale of operation k.E v e r y ﬁrm has
to rent and put in place k units of capital to be able to engage in search while vacant and to
produce while ﬁlled.5 This captures the notion that hours are a fully ﬂexible factor but capital
is relatively ﬁxed. Firms rent capital from a competitive market at ﬂow cost c.
The process that changes the match-speciﬁc productivity, x, is Poisson with ﬁnite arrival
rate λ. When a match of productivity x suﬀers a change, the new value x0 is a draw from
3This is the usual small, open economy assumption. The model abstracts from saving and accumulation
because the focus here is on isolating the eﬀects of labor-market policies on the level of TFP. But even in
the context of trying to explain income diﬀerences, Prescott (1998) and Parente and Prescott (2000) conclude
that one cannot rely on policies that cause diﬀerences in saving rates, as they do not vary systematically with
countries’ incomes.
4Note that q (θ)=m(1/θ,1) and hence q
0 < 0. The rate at which a worker contacts a vacancy is θq(θ) and
is increasing in θ. For some of the existence proofs, assuming limθ→0 q(θ)=∞ will also be useful.
5The idea is that in order to search, the ﬁrm must have borrowed some capital, say, to set up a plant, and
plants come in a single size, k.
4the ﬁxed distribution G(·). So the productivity process is persistent (since λ<∞), but–
conditional on change–it is independent of the ﬁrm’s previous state.6 The Poisson process and
the productivity draws are independently and identically distributed across ﬁrms, and there is
no aggregate uncertainty. The focus will be on steady-state outcomes.
In the next section, I will show that there is a unique productivity level Rt such that ac-
tive matches dissolve if productivity ever falls below that level and new matches form only
if their initial productivity is at least Rt.7 Let Ht (x) denote the cross-sectional productivity
distribution of active matches. That is, Ht (x) is the fraction of matches producing at produc-
tivities x or lower at time t. The time path of (1 − ut)Ht (x), the mass of matches producing
at productivities x or lower at time t,i sg i v e nb y 8
d
dt
[(1 − ut)Ht(x)] = λ(1 − ut)[1− Ht(x)][G(x) − G(Rt)] + θq(θ)ut [G(x) − G(Rt)]
−λ(1 − ut)Ht(x)G(Rt) − λ(1 − ut)Ht (x)[1− G(x)]
−δ(1 − ut)Ht (x).
The ﬁrst term accounts for the matches with productivities above x that get innovations below
x but above Rt. The newly formed matches that start oﬀ with productivities no larger than
x are in the second term. The third term represents the matches with productivity in the
interval [Rt,x] that get shocks below Rt and are destroyed. The fourth term accounts for those
matches in the same interval that “move up” by virtue of having drawn productivities larger
than x. The parameter δ<∞ denotes the arrival rate of an independent Poisson process that
causes separations for reasons unrelated to the match-speciﬁc productivity shocks. The last
6This is the process used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). For reasons that will become clear shortly,
Section 8 generalizes the model by specifying that when a match of productivity x suﬀers a change, the new
value x
0 is a draw from the ﬁxed distribution G(·|x).I fG(·|x1) <G(·|x0) when x0 <x 1, then apart from being
persistent, the idiosyncratic shocks are also positively correlated over time.
7Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) work with a bounded support and assume new matches start oﬀ with the
highest productivity. I relax these assumptions and treat active and new matches symmetrically. In the model
considered here, the initial productivity of a match is a nondegenerate random variable drawn from the same
distribution as the innovations to active matches.
8The fact that active matches will form and continue only for productivities at least as large as Rt means
that Ht (Rt)=0 . Thus, the derivation focuses on x ≥ Rt.













δ + λG(R)+θq(θ)[1− G(R)]
. (2)





Next, I consider the problems faced by a worker and a ﬁrm. The values of unemployment
and employment to a worker are denoted U and W (x), respectively, and solve
rU = b + θq(θ)
Z
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z) (4)
rW (x)=w(x)+λ
Z
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z) − (δ + λ)[W (x) − U], (5)
where r is the discount rate, b ≥ 0 denotes a worker’s ﬂow income while unemployed, and w(x)
is the wage earned by a worker employed in a match of productivity x.10
Firms can be either ﬁlled or vacant and searching. The problem of a searching ﬁrm is
summarized by
rV = −ck + q(θ)
Z
max[J (z) − V,0]dG(z), (6)
where V is the asset value of a vacancy and J (x) the asset value of a ﬁlled job with productivity
x. Letting π(x) denote ﬂow proﬁt, J (x) satisﬁes
rJ (x)=π(x)+λ
Z
max[J (z) − V,0]dG(z) − (δ + λ)[J (x) − V ], (7)
where π(x)=xmin(n,k) − w(x) − ck − φn − C (x,φ)k. Instantaneous proﬁt is the residual
output after the wage w(x) and all other costs of production have been paid out. This formula-
tion has three such costs: the rental on capital, ck;av a r i a b l ec o s t ,φn, that can be managed by
9In Section 8 I extend the analysis to the case in which the rate δ is a decreasing function of the idiosyncratic
productivity parameter x. I will discuss the reasons why this extension may be worth exploring shortly.
10This formulation assumes the worker suﬀers no disutility from work; but see Appendix B.
6varying hours; and a ﬁxed cost C per unit of capital.11 T h ev a r i a b l ec o s tφn and the ﬁxed cost
Ck are introduced to allow for the possibility of labor hoarding and underutilization of capital,
two pervasive features of the data. In the presence of these costs, for some parametrizations it
will be possible that at low productivity realizations, the ﬁrm may choose to keep the worker
employed despite requiring that she supply zero hours. In Sections 4 and 6.2 I will show that
this type of labor hoarding has interesting aggregate implications when it occurs in equilibrium.
To ﬁx ideas, one can think of φ as the cost of electricity, for instance, with electricity usage
being proportional to hours worked. Alternatively, in Appendix B I show how to modify (5) and
π(x) to get an equivalent formulation in which φn is the worker’s disutility from supplying n
hours to her employer. Either way, the key observation is that φ>0 is necessary for the model
to display the type of labor hoarding described above. Intuitively, if the marginal product of
labor, x, is lower than its marginal cost, φ ( e x p r e s s e de i t h e ri nt e r m so fr e s o u r c e st ot h eﬁrm
under the ﬁrst interpretation or in terms of disutility to the worker under the second), then
eﬃciency will require the match to set n =0 : the worker should not supply hours to the ﬁrm.
Under these circumstances, whether the ﬁrm and the worker should choose to preserve the
match is a diﬀerent matter. One possibility is that the instances in which the ﬁrm-worker pair
sets n =0are also the cases in which the pair chooses to dissolve the match. Alternatively, one
could imagine that the pair may choose n =0 , yet decide to preserve the match anticipating
that the low realization of the idiosyncratic shock may be reversed soon. In the ﬁrst scenario
no hoarding is exhibited. In the latter it is. The ﬁxed cost C introduced in this section makes
it possible for the second scenario to arise in an equilibrium with endogenous separations.
Notice that if C = φ =0 , then the model reduces to the standard setup of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). For this special case, all the results on how labor-market policies aﬀect the
level of TFP still apply even though the equilibrium does not exhibit hoarding. In this sense,
neither of these costs is essential. However, in the presence of the variable cost φ and the ﬁxed
11The cost C is ﬁxed in the sense that the ﬁrm can avoid it only by shutting down, but–as the notation
indicates–it may depend on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock and possibly also on the parameter φ.
More on this below.
7cost C, the model is also able to deliver equilibrium hoarding. And as it turns out, this feature
has interesting implications for how the aggregate production function looks.
Since the ﬁxed cost C is perhaps the only nonstandard element of the model, several remarks
are in order. First, at a technical level, incorporating a ﬁxed-cost speciﬁcation that is decreasing
in the shock x is introduced in this section as a simple device to avoid a “ﬂat spot” in ﬂow proﬁt
that would otherwise carry over to the value functions.12 Second, in Section 8 I drop the ﬁxed
cost and redo the analysis in a version of the model in which the draws of the idiosyncratic shock
are correlated over time. In another extension explored in Section 8, I again drop the ﬁxed cost
and show that the key insights also apply in a version of the model in which the destruction rate δ
is decreasing in the productivity shock. I wish to emphasize that these alternative speciﬁcations
seem natural (perhaps even more so than the usual benchmark in which the shocks hitting the
match are independent of its state) and are able to deliver hoarding without the ﬁxed cost C.13
Given all this, and for expositional purposes, I will–for the time being–use a particularly
convenient speciﬁcation for the ﬁxed cost, namely, C (x,φ)=m a x( φ − x,0).14
3 Equilibrium
I follow the bulk of the search literature by letting β ∈ [0,1) and assuming the instantaneous
wage w(x) and labor supply n solve max [W (x) − U]
β [J (x) − V ]
1−β at all times. The optimal




0 if x ≤ φ,
(8)
12See Appendix B, in particular the discussion around equation (47), for details.
13Flow proﬁth a saﬂat spot in both of these alternative formulations, but the serially correlated shocks ensure
that the value functions do not inherit this ﬂat spot.
14This formulation is convenient because it will imply that the ﬂow proﬁti sa ﬃne and strictly increasing in x.
Since–even accepting the presence of a ﬁxed cost–this particular formulation may seem somewhat contrived,
in Appendix B I redo the whole analysis with a more general speciﬁcation for the ﬁxed cost and show that
∂C(x,φ)
∂x < 0 is all that is needed. But again, see Section 8 for alternative speciﬁcations that do not rely on ﬁrms
having to bear any ﬁxed cost C.
8and substituting it into the ﬂow proﬁt function gives π(x)=( x − φ − c)k − w(x) for all x.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the instantaneous wage, w(x),i s
(1 − β)[W (x) − U]=β [J (x) − V ]. (9)
Letting S (x)=J (x)+W (x)−U −V denote the surplus from a match, notice that (9) implies
J (x)=( 1− β)S (x) and W (x) − U = βS(x). These, together with (4), (5), and (7), imply








In deriving (10) I have already acknowledged that free entry of ﬁrms will cause rV =0in
equilibrium. Since S0 (x)= k
r+δ+λ > 0, there exists a unique R such that S (x) > 0 iﬀ x>R .
Hence a ﬁrm-worker pair destroys an existing match (and chooses not to form a new match) if
it draws a productivity x<R . With this reservation strategy, the surplus can be written as




The value functions and (9) can be combined to obtain the instantaneous wages and proﬁt:
w(x)=β (x − φ − c)k +( 1− β)rU (12)
π (x)=( 1 − β)[(x − φ − c)k − rU]. (13)
Intuitively, the wage is a weighted average of output (net of the rental on capital and the
variable and ﬁxed costs) and the worker’s reservation wage.
Next, I characterize the job-creation and job-destruction decisions as summarized by θ and
R, respectively. Evaluating (11) at x = R yields λ
R
R S (z)dG(z)=rU −(R − φ − c)k. Notice
that since the expected capital gain on the left side is positive, at x = R net output is smaller
than the worker’s reservation wage. Thus, (12) and (13) imply that w(R) <r Uand π (R) < 0:
workers and ﬁrms sometimes tolerate instantaneous payoﬀs below those they could get by
9separating, in anticipation of future productivity improvements.15 Substituting this simpler
expression for the expected capital gain term into (11) gives
S (x)=
x − R
r + δ + λ
k. (14)
Evaluating (11) at x = R and using (14) to substitute S (·) yields what is usually referred
to as the job-destruction condition:











r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x − R)dG(x)=0 . (15)
As is standard, the destruction decision is independent of scale if b is. The natural inter-
pretation of b is that it is unemployment insurance income. Along these lines, if one lets
b = τbEG [w(x)|x ≥ R], where τb ∈ [0,1) is the replacement rate, then b = ˆ bk,w i t h
ˆ b =
τbβ [˜ x(R) − φ − c + cθ]
1 − (1 − β)τb
,
and ˜ x(R) ≡ EG [x|x ≥ R]=[ 1− G(R)]
−1 R
R xdG(x).U n d e rt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, b is linear in k











(x − R)dG(x)=0 .
In what follows I will always abstract from scale eﬀects caused by unemployment income b by
assuming it is a fraction of the average going wage.
Substituting the equilibrium condition rV =0in (6) implies (1 − β)
R
R S (x)dG(x)= ck
q(θ).
That is, the expected proﬁt from a ﬁlled job equals the expected hiring cost in an equilibrium
with free entry. Using (14) to substitute S (·) out of this expression yields what is often referred
to as the job-creation condition:
1 − β
r + δ + λ
Z
R




15This feature of the model is a consequence of the costly and time-consuming meeting process, as noted by
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
10The job-creation and job-destruction conditions jointly determine R and θ, and under the
maintained assumptions, they are independent of scale, k.16 For given c and φ, an equilibrium
is a vector [θ,R,H,U,w,u,K] such that (θ,R) jointly solve (15) and (16); given (θ,R), H
satisﬁes (3); U is given by (10); w is given by (12); and u is given by (2). In addition, the
market for capital services should clear, so the aggregate supply of capital K must satisfy
K =[ 1− (1 − θ)u]k, where the right side is the total demand for capital (coming from both
matched and unmatched ﬁrms). Note that in parametrizations that result in R<φ , the capital
and workers in matches with realizations in [R,φ) remain employed but are not engaged in
production. The ﬁrms in these states have excess capacity and hoard labor. The following
section provides a sharper characterization of aggregate outcomes for a particular distribution
of idiosyncratic shocks.
4 Aggregation
Let Ke denote the capital in place at all the ﬁrms with ﬁlled jobs, i.e.,
Ke =
1 − u
1 − (1 − θ)u
K. (17)
Aggregate output, Y , and the total number of hours worked, N,a r eg i v e nb y




and N =( 1− u)
R
µ n(x)dH (x),w i t hµ ≡ max(R,φ). Using (1) and (8) gives
Y (Ke,µ)=[ 1 − H (µ)]KeEH (x|x ≥ µ) (18)
N =[ 1 − H (µ)]Ke, (19)
where EH (x|x ≥ µ)=[ 1 − H (µ)]
−1 R
µxdH (x). Intuitively, since every ﬁr m - w o r k e rp a i ri s
setting hours either to zero or to full capacity k, the aggregate number of hours worked is just
16See Lemma 1 in Appendix B for conditions under which the pair (θ,R) that solves (15) and (16) exists and
is unique.
11equal to the fraction of ﬁrm-worker pairs who engage in production times the total capital
stock in ﬁlled jobs. Similarly, aggregate output equals the number of active units of capital,
[1 − H (µ)]Ke, weighted by their average productivity.17 Following Houthakker (1955—1956),
one could imagine solving (19) for the “aggregate labor demand” by active ﬁrms, µ(Ke,N),
and then substituting it in (18) to obtain Y [Ke,µ(Ke,N)]. Hereafter, I use F (Ke,N) to
denote Y [Ke,µ(Ke,N)] to simplify notation and to stress the fact that this is the economy’s
“aggregate production function.” This aggregate production function exhibits constant returns
to scale even for an arbitrary H. To see this, notice that µ(Ke,N) is homogeneous of degree
zero, and hence (18) indicates that for any ζ>0, F (ζKe,ζN)=ζF (Ke,N).18







¢α if ε ≤ x,
(20)
where ε>0 and α>1. Then, provided R ≥ ε, 1 − G(R)=
¡ ε
R
¢α and hence G(x) − G(R)=
(ε/R)
α [1 − (R/x)







¢α if R ≤ x.
(21)
So the steady-state productivity distribution of active matches follows a Pareto distribution with
parameters R and α. Using (21), 1−H (µ)=( R
µ)α and EH (x|x ≥ µ)= α
α−1µ, so the aggregates
(18) and (19) specialize to Y (Ke,µ)= α
α−1Rαµ1−αKe and N =( R/µ)
α Ke. Inverting the latter
yields µ =( Ke/N)
1/α R, and substituting this in the former implies
F (Ke,N)=AKγ
eN1−γ, (22)
17A sm e n t i o n e di nf o o t n o t e7 ,M o r t e n s e na n dP i s s a r i d e s( 1 9 9 4 )a s s u m et h a tG has support [0,1] and that all
new matches start oﬀ with productivity 1.S o ,w i t hδ =0 , aggregate output in their model evolves according to




Replacing (1 − u)k with Ke, steady-state output is Y =
θq(θ)uk
λ +[ 1− H (µ)]KeEH (x|x ≥ µ), which looks like
(18) except for the ﬁrst term. Assuming that the initial productivity of a new match is a random draw from G–
just as the innovations to the productivity of ongoing matches–allows for a density G with unbounded support.
In addition, this alternative assumption smooths aggregate output by getting rid of the “spike” θq(θ)ukλ
−1.
18Also, from (18), F2 (Ke,N)=−µ2 (Ke,N)KeµdH (µ),a n df r o m( 1 9 ) ,−µ2 (Ke,N)KedH (µ)=1 .T h u s ,
F2 (Ke,N)=µ. So the marginal product of labor in the aggregate production function is equal to the marginal






and γ ≡ 1/α. This aggregation result is reminiscent of the classic aggregation result of
Houthakker (1955—1956).19 The factor A is what macroeconomists normally refer to as TFP.
Its level depends on α, a parameter of the primitive distribution of productivity shocks, as well
as on all the characteristics of the labor market as summarized by the destruction decision, R.
5 Labor-Market Policies and the Level of TFP
This section considers the eﬀects of four policies: employment subsidies, hiring subsidies, ﬁr-
ing taxes, and unemployment beneﬁts. I follow Pissarides (2000) and model the subsidies as
transfers from the government to the ﬁrm and the ﬁring taxes as payments from the ﬁrm to
the government.20 The value function W (x) is still given by (5), while (4), (6), and (7) now
generalize to
rU = τb + θq(θ)
Z
max[Wo (z) − U,0]dG(z)
rV = −ck + q(θ)
Z
max[Jo (z)+τhk − V,0]dG(z)
rJ (x)=π(x)+τek + λ
Z
max[J (z) − V + τfk,0]dG(z) − (δ + λ)[J (x) − V + τfk].
The policy variables are a hiring subsidy, τh, an employment subsidy, τe,aﬁring tax, τf,a n d
unemployment beneﬁts, τb.21 In Appendix B I show that if G is as in (20), the job-destruction
19I discuss this relationship at some length in Section 6.
20I assume that upon separation, the ﬁrm must pay the ﬁring tax to the government because in the present
setup, ﬁring taxes would be completely neutral under the alternative scheme in which the ﬁrm compensates the
ﬁred worker directly.
21All payments are assumed to be proportional to the ﬁrm’s size, as measured by k. For example, upon
separation, the ﬁrm is taxed τfk, and while unemployed, the worker receives τbk from the government. This
assumption, borrowed from Pissarides (2000), is convenient because it ensures that policies introduce no scale
eﬀects into the job-creation and job-destruction decisions. Also, to keep the analysis simple, I will ignore the
government’s ﬁnancing constraints. A natural extension would be requiring the government to run a balanced
budget. A simple example of a scheme that is self-ﬁnancing in the steady state is τf = τh and τb = τe =0 .
13and job-creation conditions that determine the equilibrium pair (θ,R) are












¢α (τh − τf) − c
(1−β)q(θ) =0 . (25)
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose ε +( α − 1)(r + δ + λ)(τh − τf) > 0.L e t θ∗
  be deﬁned by q(θ∗
 )=
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)c












c + τh + rτf − τb.I f
ε + α(r + δ + λ)(τh − τf) > 0, then for any φ>φ ε (a) there exists a unique equilibrium, (b)
R>ε ,( c )∂R/∂φ > 0 and (d) ∂θ/∂φ < 0. If in addition φ  − ε>0,t h e n( e )t h e r ei sa
nondegenerate interval (φ ,e φ) such that R(φ) <φfor all φ ∈ (φ ,e φ).
Aggregate output is still given by (22); the aggregate stock of capital in ﬁlled jobs, Ke,i ss t i l l
given by (17); and the aggregate number of hours worked, N, is still given by N =( R/µ)
α Ke.
In addition, if the measure of capital used to construct aggregate output is Ke, then the level
of TFP is still as in (23). The following result, which holds under the assumptions stated in
Proposition 1, summarizes the eﬀects that labor-market policies have on the level of TFP.
Proposition 2 Employment subsidies and ﬁring taxes reduce A. Hiring subsidies and unem-
ployment beneﬁts increase A.
Since A is proportional to R, policies have the same qualitative eﬀect on TFP as they have on
the destruction rate. Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1.
Employment subsidies make ﬁrms more tolerant of low productivity realizations and hence
lower the average productivity of active ﬁrms. All else equal, an economy with relatively
high subsidies to continued employment will exhibit a low job-destruction rate, a high job-
creation rate, and hence low levels of unemployment and measured TFP. Firing taxes have a
similar qualitative eﬀect on job destruction, but that mechanism is reinforced by a relatively
low rate of job creation (which reduces the reservation wage and hence makes ﬁrms even more
14Figure 1: Equilibrium eﬀects of policies on job-creation (JC) and job-destruction (JD) rates
tolerant of low productivity realizations). So ﬁring restrictions will reduce measured TFP, as
well as the job-creation and job-destruction rates. Hiring subsidies have no direct eﬀect on the
destruction decision, but they do stimulate job creation. This increases market tightness, which
in turn increases the worker’s outside option and raises measured TFP, job creation, and job
destruction. Unemployment beneﬁts also cause R to rise through an increase in the worker’s
reservation wage. Consequently, economies with relatively high unemployment beneﬁts will
tend to exhibit relatively high levels of TFP and unemployment.22
22Notice that these results obtain if factor inputs are measured rather accurately, so that the TFP residual
corresponds to (23). But naturally, what is measured as the TFP residual, as well as how it responds to policy,
will depend on the accuracy with which factor inputs are measured. See Sections 6.2 and 7 below.
156 Discussion
In this section I elaborate on several issues that were raised in the previous sections. First, I
explain the similarities and diﬀerences between the well-known aggregation result of Houthakker
(1955—1956) and the one I obtained in Section 4. I then use the aggregation result to show how
the observed level of TFP depends on the measurement of factor inputs. Finally, I comment
on the implications of the theory for the standard growth accounting exercises that presume
frictionless markets and competitive pricing.
6.1 Houthakker
Houthakker (1955—1956) studies the problem of aggregating the technological possibilities of
individual production units (e.g., ﬁrms) into a production function for a group of units (e.g., an
industry). He considers a set of heterogeneous production units that can employ two variable
factors, x1 and x2, to produce output, x0, and face capacity constraints due to a ﬁxed, unmod-
eled factor. Each unit j has access to a ﬁxed-proportions technology x0j =m i n (x1
a1j, x2
a2j,ϕ j).
That is, a1j units of input 1 and a2j units of input 2 are needed to produce one unit of x0,a n d
the unmodeled ﬁxed inputs limit the production unit’s possible output to ϕj units of x0.T h e
setup is static and the notion of equilibrium partial: each production unit j seeks to maximize
proﬁt, 1 − x1jp1 − x2jp2, where pi is the price of input i =1 ,2 (the price of output has been
normalized to 1). The optimal choice of inputs for production unit j is
xij =
½
aijϕj if 1 − a1jp1 − a2jp2 ≥ 0
0 if 1 − a1jp1 − a2jp2 < 0,
(26)
for i =1 ,2. Units that can attain positive proﬁt produce at full capacity, i.e., they set x0j = ϕj,
whereas those that cannot, remain inactive, i.e., they set xij =0for i =0 ,1,2.L e ta =( a1,a 2)
and assume a density, ϕ(a), of (the various levels of) capacity constraints across production
cells. Observe that total output is
X0 = f0 (p1,p 2), (27)








0 ϕ(a)da. The total amount used of variable input i is
Xi = fi (p1,p 2) for i =1 ,2, (28)







0 aiϕ(a)da. Then, similar to what was done in Section 4, one
m a yb ea b l et os o l v et h et w oe x p r e s s i o n si n( 2 8 )f o rp r i c e s ,i . e . ,pi = gi (X1,X 2),a n dt h e n
substitute these expressions back into (27) to get a functional relationship between aggregate
output and the aggregate quantities of the variable inputs: the aggregate production function.
Speciﬁcally, X0 = F (X1,X 2), where F (X1,X 2) ≡ f0 [g1 (X1,X 2),g 2 (X1,X 2)].C l e a r l y , t h e
shape of the aggregate F will depend on the particular shape of the distribution of capacities,









2 , where C, γ1,a n d
γ2 are expressions involving only the parameters of the primitive distribution (α1, α2,a n dκ),
and γ1 + γ2 < 1.
In my analysis, I have assumed each production unit employs a single variable factor (la-
bor) as well as capital. Capital is chosen before engaging in search and then remains ﬁxed,
hence playing the role of the ﬁxed factor constraining output at the time that employment and
production decisions are made. In Houthakker’s language, I am working with a single vari-
able production input and explicitly modeling the ﬁxed factor that constrains capacity. This
formulation delivers an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale, whereas
the setup used by Houthakker generates a function of the variable inputs only, and it exhibits
diminishing returns. We also have some diﬀerences in the way we model the heterogeneity
across production units: Houthakker’s production units diﬀer in terms of their static capacity
constraints (interpreted as the quantities of the unmodeled ﬁxed production factor), whereas
mine diﬀer due to random productivities that evolve over time. But despite all these diﬀerences,
note that the factor allocation rule in the search equilibrium, (8), is reminiscent of (26) and
that (18) and (19) are the analogues of (27) and (28).
Another technical diﬀerence between both analyses is that by virtue of working within a
17partial equilibrium framework, Houthakker had the freedom to assume the particular shape of
the heterogeneity across production units to be used in the integrals on the right sides of (27)
and (28). Loosely speaking, his production units could not “move around the distribution.”
In contrast, because I am working within the context of a dynamic equilibrium model, I do
not have the freedom to choose the distribution that shows up in the aggregates. Speciﬁcally, I
cannot choose H, which corresponds to Houthakker’s ϕ,b e c a u s eH is not a primitive. I can only
specify G. This introduces an additional layer of complexity, since the mapping between the
primitive distribution of shocks, G, and the equilibrium distribution, H, depends on equilibrium
forces.23
From the perspective of understanding the determinants of TFP, a crucial diﬀerence is that
the shift parameter in Houthakker’s production function (what he called C) is solely a function
of the parameters in the primitive productivity distribution. But in the model I developed
above, government policy can–through the agents’ decisions–aﬀect the multiplicative factor
in front of the aggregate production function.
At this point it may be useful to stress that in this context, by an “aggregate production
function” I mean an equilibrium relationship between measured aggregate inputs and output.I n
terms of (22), the fact that this is an equilibrium relationship implies that in general, a change in
policy parameters (e.g., unemployment beneﬁt s )w i l ln o ta ﬀect γ but will aﬀect N, Ke,a n dA.
Intuitively, one may regard A as an additional “factor,” which has to do with how production is
organized across micro units, and naturally this factor responds to policy, much as, say, hours
worked would. The contemporary reader may wonder: If this is what an aggregate production
function is, then what does “aggregation” mean?
The classic problem of aggregation of production functions consists of ﬁnding an aggregate
relationship between an output aggregate and input aggregates. For example, suppose the
23In the model of Section 2, with independently and identically distributed productivity shocks, H is simply
the truncation of G. Since the Pareto family is closed under truncations, the mapping between the primitive G
and the equilibrium distribution H is simple, as is evident from (20) and (21). This simplicity is retained in the
formulation with serially correlated shocks that I work out in Section 8.1. The mapping between G and H is less
straightforward in other cases; for example, see the results in Section 8.2.
18production function for the jth productive unit is yj = fj (Kj,N j). Assume capital and labor
are homogeneous, and let K =
P
j Kj and L =
P
j Nj. The problem of aggregation consists of
ﬁnding conditions under which there exists a function F such that
P
j yj = F (K,N).I th a s
been known since the late 1940’s that if nothing else is said, the general conditions under which
such aggregation can be performed are extremely restrictive. Except in some very special
cases, in an economy with multiple production units, the amount of total output that can
be obtained from diﬀerent levels of total inputs is not unique; the distribution of the inputs
matters.24 For this reason, the aggregation literature has traditionally deﬁn e da na g g r e g a t e
production function as a relationship between the amount of total output produced, not from
any arbitrary levels of total inputs, but for levels of total inputs that satisfy some conditions.
For example, the aggregate production function in Houthakker (1955—1956) is a relationship
between aggregate output and aggregate inputs–given that the allocation of inputs across
production units is consistent with proﬁt maximization. Similarly, the aggregate production
function (22) is a relationship between aggregate output and aggregate inputs–given that the
allocation of inputs across production units is consistent with equilibrium.25
6.2 Measurement
The aggregate production function in (22) expresses output as a function of the aggregate
number of hours worked, N, and the total amount of capital hired by ﬁrms with ﬁlled jobs, Ke.
The aggregate is Cobb-Douglas despite ﬁxed proportions in the micro-level technologies. This
result obtains when there is hoarding and capital utilization is imperfectly measured, i.e., when
the capital stock included as an argument in the aggregate production function is the one in
place in ﬁrms that are employing workers, although some of it may be idle. Notice that if there
is no hoarding in equilibrium (i.e., if µ = R), then N = Ke and F (Ke,N)=AK
γ
eN1−γ = AKe.
If there is hoarding but utilization is perfectly measured, then aggregate output is again linear
24To see this point, try to add up two identical Cobb-Douglas production functions without further restrictions.
For more on this, see Fisher (1969) and references therein.
25These notions should be familiar: The standard aggregation result for the one-sector growth model with
constant-returns technologies also relies on a distribution of inputs consistent with ﬁrm proﬁt maximization.
19in the relevant capital stock. To see this explicitly, let Kp denote the capital stock being used
in production, that is, Kp =[ 1− H (µ)]Ke. Then it follows from (18) that Y = A00Kp,w i t h
A00 ≡ EH (x|x ≥ φ). So the imperfect measurement of capital utilization as described, coupled
with some degree of hoarding, causes the aggregate to look Cobb-Douglas in capital and hours
despite ﬁxed proportions in the micro production functions. Since having ﬁrm-worker pairs that
s o m e t i m e sc h o o s et ob ei n a c t i v ea ﬀects the shape of the aggregates, in Appendix B I derive
conditions on primitives such that the equilibrium will exhibit this labor-hoarding property.
Although hoarding and the measurement of factor utilization have implications for the shape
of the aggregate production function, one should not conclude that the theory predicts only
productivity diﬀerentials due to hoarding and mismeasured utilization. For example, even if
t h e r ei sn oh o a r d i n ga ta l l ,t h eT F Pt e r mi se q u a lt oαR/(α − 1), the mean of the productivity
distribution of active ﬁrms. Of course, the way inputs are measured in general, and in particular
the extent to which their utilization rates are correctly measured, will aﬀect the TFP factor
when it is measured as a residual. I turn to this issue next.
Consider how the observed level of TFP is aﬀected by the diﬀerent ways of measuring ag-
gregate inputs that can be found in the growth accounting literature. The measure of capital
input used by Hall and Jones (1999), for example, did not adjust for utilization. This means
that something like K instead of Ke was used as an input in the aggregate production func-





A. In addition, Hall and Jones
(1999) report they did not have data on hours per worker for all countries in their sample,
so they used the number of employed workers instead of hours worked as a measure of labor
input. Letting E =1− u denote employment and using (17), the number of hours worked is
N =( R/µ)
1/γ KE
1−(1−θ)u, so–from the standpoint of the theory developed here–the aggregate
relationship between inputs, output, and TFP that they measured was ˜ F (K,E)= ˜ AKγE1−γ,





ˆ A. In Section 7 I will quantify the impact that each of the labor
market policies introduced in Section 5 has on the TFP residual for these diﬀerent ways of
measuring factor inputs.
206.3 Standard Growth Accounting
Macroeconomists interested in identifying the sources of diﬀerences in output per worker ﬁnd
it useful to relate aggregate measures of output to aggregate measures of capital and labor
t h r o u g ha na g g r e g a t ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n .A sam a t t e ro fa c c o u n t i n g ,t h i sa b s t r a c t i o na l l o w s
one to attribute the observed variation in output levels to diﬀerences in the quantities of the
inputs and to diﬀerences in an unexplained TFP residual. The overwhelming majority of these
growth accounting exercises adopts a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the aggregate production
function.26
Virtually all these growth accounting exercises rest either explicitly or implicitly on the
premise that the model with frictionless markets and competitive pricing is a good approxima-
tion to the actual economy. But what if it is not? What if the actual economy lay closer to a
model where labor markets are frictional and prices determined by bargaining? Would adopting
this alternative view–as many economists have over the last 20 years to study various macro
questions–imply that the standard growth accounting exercises that adopt a Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation, e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Parente and
Prescott (2000), and many others, are misspeciﬁed in ways that render them completely unin-
formative?
On a positive note, the analysis of Section 4 oﬀers a relatively standard search model–with
its underlying meeting frictions, simple ﬁxed-proportions micro-level production technologies,
and prices determined by bargaining–according to which the standard growth accounting exer-
cises that adopt a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the aggregate technology have in fact chosen
the right functional form. The problem is, of course, that the direct mapping between fac-
tor income shares and the elasticities in the aggregate production function that exists in the
26The most common justiﬁcation for adopting this particular speciﬁcation is that, at least for some countries,
notably the United States and the United Kingdom, factor income shares have remained roughly constant over
long periods of time, despite rather large secular changes in factor prices. (See Figure 1 in Gollin, 2002, and the
bottom panel of Figure 1 in Blanchard, 1997.) And, as pointed out by the eponym Cobb and Douglas (1928),
the speciﬁcation implies constant factor shares of income if factors are paid their marginal products.
21frictionless model with competitive prices that underlies the standard growth accounting ex-
ercises is distorted in the search economy. Suppose, for example, that a growth accountant
assumes Y = BKσ
e N1−σ and works under the presumption that factor markets are competi-
tive and frictionless, when instead the actual economy is as described in Sections 2—4, so that
Y = AK
γ
eN1−γ is in fact the correct relationship between aggregate output and inputs. The
TFP residual measured by this accountant would be B =[ 1− H (µ)]
σ−γ A.27 Since he uses the
competitive model to think about the actual economy, the accountant will be inclined to set σ
equal to the capital share in income from his data. In contrast, an accountant who organizes
his thoughts using the model in Section 4 will be led to look at purely technological features
of the actual economy to pin down γ.28 The relationship between the size and direction of the
bias and these fundamentals is simple: The absolute size of the bias increases in the degree of
hoarding. No hoarding implies the accountant with the “wrong” (competitive) model would
still recover the “right” TFP factor. The direction of the bias, when there is one, depends
on the sign of σ − γ. If there is some hoarding, and the capital share in the data is smaller
than the technological parameter γ, then the accountant guided by the competitive model will
overestimate the size of the true productivity residual.
In summary, the theory developed here provides foundations–which rest on a model with
a frictional labor market and noncompetitive wages–for the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the
aggregate production function commonly used by macroeconomists for growth accounting. The
theory implies a mapping between observables and the elasticity parameter in the aggregate
that is diﬀerent from that implied by the competitive model, and it can be used to assess the
implications of this diﬀerence for the size of the measured residual.
The emphasis throughout the paper is on understanding the determinants of the TFP
27Here I have assumed that the accountant measures only the capital in place in ﬁrms that have positive
employment, Ke, but it may be more realistic to suppose he instead measures the total capital stock, K.I ft h i s





[1 − H (µ)]
σ−γ A.
28Recall that γ =1 /α is a parameter of the underlying distribution of shocks. So, for example, the growth
accountant may attempt to infer it from the distribution of value added across production units. I thank Esteban
Rossi-Hansberg for suggesting this possibility.
22residual, and factor income shares are not central to this issue from the standpoint of the
theory. However, factor income shares play a crucial role in standard growth accounting, so
the reader may feel that some remarks on the nature of the factor shares in the model may be
in order. In this model, factor income shares are not immutable technological constants: they
depend not only on technological considerations but also on labor market policies or anything
else that aﬀects the division of rents between workers and employers. For example, policies that
increase the unemployment rate will tend to decrease the labor share.29
I conclude this section by commenting on where this paper stands relative to the literature
that uses growth accounting to frame some fundamental questions in development economics.
In the model developed here, diﬀerences in TFP arise from composition eﬀects, i.e., through
the way production inputs, particularly hours of work, are allocated across micro production
units. This feature of the theory naturally leads one to think of institutions that may distort
this allocation of resources, and this is where labor-market policies come in as a natural suspect.
Note that the mechanisms at work in this paper allow two economies to exhibit diﬀerent levels
of TFP even if production units in both have access to the same technology and are subject
to identical shocks. But the world’s richest and poorest countries seem to have very diﬀerent
production technologies in place, so trying to explain 30-fold output-per-worker diﬀerences
keeping technologies the same and relying exclusively on policies that only distort the allocation
29Blanchard (1997) documents the decline in the labor share for continental European countries (France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain) during 1970—1995. He oﬀers changes in policies and institutional considerations that
aﬀected the relative bargaining positions of employers and workers as plausible explanations. Interestingly–
from the point of view of the competitive model–nonconstant factor shares imply that the aggregate production
function could not be Cobb-Douglas. But from the point of view of the aggregative model developed here,
this conclusion does not follow: it can exhibit nonconstant factor shares and, with a Pareto distribution of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, it can still aggregate up to a Cobb-Douglas production function. To illustrate,
let sw and sk denote the labor and capital shares, respectively, and consider a version of the basic model in which
φ indexes a worker’s disutility from work (see Appendix B), b = τbk,a n dt h e r ei sn oﬁxed cost (i.e., C =0 ).
Then,






and sk =1− sw,
where zk ≡ [1 − (1 − ξ)(1− β)]c − (1 − ξ)[βcθ +( 1− β)τb], zn ≡ (1 − ξ)(1− β)φ,a n dξ is an accounting





23of resources (labor or otherwise), would seem misguided.30 In the following section I calibrate
the model economy and show that–if assessed within the context of a homogeneous set of
countries, e.g., the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)–the
magnitude of the eﬀe c t so fl a b o rm a r k e tp o l i c i e so nt h el e v e lo fm e a s u r e dT F Pc a ni ns o m e
cases be signiﬁcant.
7 Quantitative Analysis
Consider an extension of the model of Section 5 where upon meeting, the ﬁrm-worker match




if ε0 ≤ x and G0 (x)=1−
¡ε0
x
¢α =0otherwise, where ε0 > 0. Subsequent draws are from
(20). As I show in Appendix B (Lemma 3), for this case the equilibrium cumulative distribution
function of active ﬁrms is given by (21). The job-creation and job-destruction conditions are
given by (24) and (25), but with ε0 replacing ε in (25).31
I will follow the bulk of the search and matching labor literature in assuming that the
meeting rate of a vacancy is q(θ)=θ−η,w i t hη ∈ (0,1). To calibrate this model to the United
States, I set τf = τh = τe =0 , which is meant to reﬂect its relatively ﬂexible labor market
regulations. Since the model will generate endogenous separations, I also set δ =0 .T h i sl e a v e s
30In order to make the quantitative leap to development accounting within the context of this model, one
may have to formalize the notion that the policies considered not only distort the allocation of inputs but also
hinder the adoption of better technologies. Although they focus on monopoly rights in their formal modeling of
barriers to technology adoption, Parente and Prescott (2000) mention several labor-market policies as examples
of “barriers to riches”: “In India, for example, ﬁrms with more than 100 workers must obtain the government’s
permission to terminate any worker, and ﬁrms of all sizes are subject to state certiﬁcation of changes in the
tasks associated with a job” (pp. 107-108). “Another way the state protects the monopoly rights is by requiring
large severance payments to laid-oﬀ workers.” “Also in India, regulations require certain ﬁrms to award workers
with lifetime employment and require ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a nt w e n t y - ﬁve workers to use oﬃcial labor exchanges
to ﬁll any vacancy” (p. 108). “In Bangladesh, for example, private buyers of the state-owned jute mills were
prohibited for one year from laying oﬀ any of the workforce they inherited. After one year, a worker could be
laid oﬀ but not without a large severance payment.” Parente and Prescott use these examples as instances of
policies that can lower TFP by making technology adoption costly, whereas I emphasize that these policies have
ad i r e c ti m p a c to nt h el e v e lo fT F Pt h r o u g hc o m p o s i t i o ne ﬀects–even for given technology. See footnote 1 for
some issues that the model developed here may be well suited for.
31Varying ε0 relative to ε will help calibrate the model by allowing me to vary the job-creation condition in
much the same way as the usual cost of posting vacancies does in the standard formulation of the Mortensen—
Pissarides model. Recall that in my formulation, a ﬁrm’s only ﬂo wc o s tf r o ms e a r c h i n gi sh a v i n gt op a yr e n t a lc
on the capital k,a n dc will be pinned down by the interest rate.
2410 free parameters: r, c, ε, η, β, α, λ, ε0, τb,a n dφ. I normalize the time period to be a quarter
and set r = c =0 .012, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.953. I also normalize
ε =1 .Is e tη =0 .72, which is close to the upper bound of the range reported by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001), and let β = η so that there would be no ineﬃciencies in the absence of
policy.32
Several studies point out that various measures of ﬁrm size are well approximated by a
Pareto distribution with a curvature parameter near 1. Axtell (2001), for example, documents
this fact using the number of employees and sales as measures of ﬁrm size. The model I am
calibrating is in some ways too stark: for example, each ﬁrm employs a single worker, and it
does not distinguish between output and sales. But notice that the equilibrium distribution
of output across active ﬁrms is Pareto with curvature parameter α. These considerations may
suggest a natural strategy to calibrate α. However, since the purpose here is mainly to explore
the properties of the model for reasonable parametrizations rather than to devise a deﬁnitive
calibration strategy, I will report results for three values of α: 1.1, 3/2,a n d3. The remaining
parameters (λ,ε0,τb,φ) are calibrated so that in the stationary equilibrium, the model implies
that (i) employment spells last 2.5 years on average; (ii) an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job with
probability 0.45 per month; (iii) the replacement rate is 11%; and (iv) the fraction of hoarded
employed workers is relatively small, in particular 0.05.33
For the benchmark case (α =3 /2), the values of the calibrated parameters are λ =1 .23,
ε0 =0 .6, τb =0 .22,a n dφ =1 .095. The implied means of the distributions G and G0 are
3 and 1.84, respectively. In the equilibrium, R =1 .058, and the average wage is ¯ w =2 .014.
32Here I am following Shimer (2005), who estimates η =0 .72 and also sets β = η. See Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2005) for an alternative calibration strategy. In Appendix B, I report results for my own alternative calibration
strategy, which instead sets β to match the labor share.
33For observations (i) and (ii), see Shimer (2005). Observation (iii) corresponds to the average value over the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of unemployment expressed as a percentage of previous tax earnings for a single worker reported
by the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994). Most of the empirical work on labor hoarding has focused on its
cyclical properties and their implications for the Solow residual-based measures of technology shocks, and for the
extent to which technology shocks account for the volatility of aggregate output (e.g., Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo, 1993). I have not been able to ﬁnd empirical estimates of the average level of labor hoarding in
my perusal of the literature. Consequently, target (iv) is not based on any hard data, but just meant to be
illustrative.
25τi/¯ wD u A τi/A0 ˆ Aτi/ ˆ A0 ˜ Aτi/ ˜ A0 H (φ)
baseline 0.11 10 0.069 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.050
τb 0.25 0.12 7 0.096 1.023 0.847 0.787 0.017
0.19 0.10 18 0.038 0.975 1.318 1.497 0.086
τf 0.02 0.01 16 0.041 0.977 1.278 1.432 0.082
0.04 0.02 54 0.012 0.954 1.973 2.717 0.114
τe 0.02 0.01 14 0.048 0.983 1.183 1.277 0.074
0.04 0.02 23 0.030 0.968 1.463 1.745 0.095
τh 0.02 0.01 7 0.096 1.023 0.840 0.777 0.017
0.03 0.02 6 0.108 1.034 0.786 0.706 0.001
T a b l e1 :B a s e l i n er e s u l t s
Table 1 reports the eﬀects of small changes in the policy parameters τb, τf, τe,a n dτh,o n
the average duration of a job, D =[ λG(R)]
−1, the unemployment rate, u, the three measures
of TFP described in Section 6.2 (i.e., A = Y
K
γ
e N1−γ, ˆ A = Y
KγN1−γ,a n d ˜ A = Y
KγE1−γ), and
the degree of labor hoarding. I use subscripts to index the various policy scenarios, e.g., A0
denotes the level of TFP at the baseline with no policy, and Aτi denotes the level of TFP
under policy τi,f o ri = b,f,e,h.T h eﬁrst row just shows that the model hits the calibration
targets: the replacement rate τb/¯ w is exactly 11%, and on average a job lasts 10 quarters,
which, together with a probability of 0.45 per month that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job,
implies an unemployment rate of 6.9%.A l s o ,H (φ)=.05, indicating that in the equilibrium
5% of the ﬁrms hoard labor.
Increasing the replacement rate from 11% to 12% (which is achieved by increasing τb from
0.22 to 0.25) shifts the job-destruction condition upward as in the top-right panel of Figure
1. The increase in R causes the expected duration of a job to fall to seven quarters, and this,
together with the reduction in job creation induced by the fall in θ, causes the unemployment
rate to increase to 9.6%. According to the ﬁrst measurement convention, A, for which the capital
stock in the aggregate production function is Ke and hours worked are measured accurately,
the 1% increase in the replacement rate causes a 2.3% increase in R and hence a 2.3% increase
in TFP.
26The measurement issues discussed in Section 6.2, however, are critical. For example, under
the second measurement convention, ˆ A, for which the capital stock in the aggregate production
function is K and hours worked are measured accurately, the 1% increase in replacement rate
causes an 18% reduction in the measured residual. This method is picking up such a large
reduction in TFP because after the increase in unemployment beneﬁts, the unemployment rate
is signiﬁcantly higher, and hence a signiﬁcantly higher fraction of the capital stock that is
counted as an aggregate input is now sitting idle in unmatched ﬁrms. Recall that the third
measurement convention, ˜ A, is the one that uses K and employment (instead of hours worked)
as inputs. According to this measure, TFP falls by 27%.34
Intuitively, the second way to measure inputs perfectly measures the utilization rate of
labor, but does not measure the utilization rate of capital at all (it cannot even distinguish
machines sitting in empty job slots from those matched to workers). And the third way does
not adjust for the utilization rate of either factor. In terms of labor, it counts both workers
who are employed and supplying hours as well as those who are employed but not supplying
hours. The policy causes unemployment to rise, which reduces the economy-wide utilization
rate of capital and labor. Thus, the measures that don’t adjust for utilization capture a sharp
r e d u c t i o ni nt h eT F Pr e s i d u a l .
Introducing a ﬁring tax that corresponds to 1% of the average quarterly wage reduces
unemployment by 2.8 percentage points. TFP as measured by A drops by 2.3% but rises when
measured by ˆ A or ˜ A,b y28% and 43%, respectively.35 The intuition for the ﬁrst measure is
clear: the productivity of the average active ﬁrm is lower because the policy makes separations
more costly, and hence lower-quality matches survive in the presence of ﬁring restrictions. The
large increases in aggregate productivity as measured by ˆ A and ˜ A are again due to the fact that
34The decline is larger for the third measure because the total number of hours worked, averaged over all
employed workers, falls in response to the increase in τb.
35In a recent paper, Chari, Restuccia, and Urrutia (2005) develop a matching model with dynamic labor
contracts in which ﬁrms provide general training to workers who cannot commit to staying with the ﬁrm.
Within this setup, they ﬁnd that ﬁring costs can increase measured productivity, and they argue that this result
is borne out by European data.
27the unemployment rate is lower, and hence the utilization rate of the factors is higher with the
policy. The magnitudes of the eﬀects of the remaining policies are similar.36
Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B report results for other two parametrizations: α =1 .1 and
α =3 . Essentially, the policy eﬀects are much larger for the former and much smaller for the
latter. Table 4 in Appendix B reports results for another calibration strategy. There, instead
of following Shimer (2005) in setting β = η =0 .72, I keep η =0 .72 and calibrate β jointly
with (λ,ε0,τb,φ) so that the model also reproduces a labor share of 0.66. The general message
from these exercises is that (i) the value of the curvature parameter of the Pareto distribution,
α, is a critical determinant of the size of the eﬀects that policy can have on TFP through
composition eﬀects (the eﬀects tend to get larger as α approaches 1), and (ii) if factors are
measured relatively inaccurately (e.g., when the TFP residual equals ˆ A or ˜ A), the policy eﬀects
on TFP are much larger and have the opposite sign than if the inputs are measured accurately
(e.g., when the TFP residual equals A).
8E x t e n s i o n s
In this section I extend the basic model to the case of serially correlated shocks and derive two
additional aggregation results.
8.1 Correlated Shocks
Section 4 established that, with some mismeasurement and equilibrium hoarding, the standard
search model of the labor market with a particular structure of shocks generates a relationship
between aggregate inputs and output that looks exactly like the standard Cobb-Douglas relation
typically used in growth accounting exercises. The ﬁxed cost C (x,φ) was introduced in Section
2a sas i m p l ed e v i c et oa v o i d“ ﬂat spots” in the value functions, and this made it possible for
36But note that ﬁnancing the employment subsidy is relatively more costly than ﬁnancing the hiring subsidy,
since the former is paid out continuously to existing matches, whereas the latter just entails a one-time payment
when the match is ﬁrst formed.
28the equilibrium to exhibit hoarding.37 Here I show that by extending the model in a natural
way, one can drop the ﬁxed cost without aﬀecting the main results. To this end, I generalize the
productivity process by allowing for serially correlated shocks: when a match of productivity
x suﬀers a change, the new value x0 is a draw from the ﬁxed distribution G(x0|x). Assuming
G(x|x1) <G(x|x0) if x0 <x 1 allows idiosyncratic shocks to be positively correlated through
time. For this case, the cross section of productivities evolves according to
d
dt
[(1 − ut)Ht (x)] = λ(1 − ut)
Z ∞
x












[1 − G(x|s)]dHt (s) − δ(1 − ut)Ht (x).
The ﬁrst term accounts for the matches with productivities above x that get innovations below x
but above Rt. The newly formed matches that start oﬀ with productivities no larger than x are
in the second term. Notice the assumption that upon contact, the worker and ﬁrm draw their
productivity level from the density corresponding to the average productivity among active
matches.38 The third term is the number of matches in the interval [Rt,x] that get shocks
below Rt and are destroyed. The fourth term accounts for the number of matches in the same
interval that “move up” by virtue of having drawn productivities larger than x.T h el a s tt e r m
37For C (x,φ)=0 , π(x)=[ m a x( x − φ,0) − c]k − w(x),s oπ(x) is ﬂat up to φ a n dt h e nr i s e sw i t hs l o p ek.
It is easy to show that in this case, J (x) is also ﬂat up to φ and then rises with slope
k
r+δ+λ.N o t et h a ts i n c e
R is deﬁned by J (R)=0 , this implies that generically the equilibrium with endogenous destruction will have
φ<R ; i.e., there is no hoarding except for the knife-edge case in which R is indeterminate. Ruling out these
types of ﬂat spots in J allows for the possibility that R<φin an equilibrium with endogenous destruction. See
Appendix B for details.
38When shocks are independently and identically distributed, one can specify that new matches draw z from
G(z) just as active matches do when forced to update their shock. However, with correlated shocks active
matches with state z draw the new shock z
0 from G(z
0|z). Since vacancies and unemployed workers have no
productivity attached to them, I assume their initial draw z




way of motivating this, imagine–as do Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)–that ﬁrms must irreversibly adopt a
“technology” to engage in production. The present speciﬁcation then means that they draw their technology at
random from all those active at the time the match is created. Jeﬀrey Campbell pointed out to me that Conlisk
(1989) uses a similar assumption to determine the productivity of newly created plants in a model of technical
change.
29accounts for matches in the interval [Rt,x] that are destroyed for exogenous reasons. Imposing







(δ + λ)(1− u)
¸Z
[G(x|s) − G(R|s)]dH (s).









[1 − G(R|s)]dH (s)
. (29)
Using this expression, the steady-state cross-sectional productivity distribution becomes
H (x)=
R
[G(x|s) − G(R|s)]dH (s) R
[1 − G(R|s)]dH (s)
, (30)
a natural generalization of (3).
The problem of a searching ﬁrm is now summarized by
rV = −ck + q(θ)
ZZ
max[J (z) − V,0]dG(z|x)dH (x). (31)
Again, entry of ﬁrms will occur until all rents are exhausted, so rV =0in equilibrium. The
value of a ﬁlled job with productivity x is
rJ (x)=π(x)+λ
Z
max[J (z) − V,0]dG(z|x) − (δ + λ)[J (x) − V ], (32)
where π (x)=xmin(n,k) − φn − ck − w(x).F l o wp r o ﬁt π(x) is the residual remaining after
the wage w(x) and all other costs of production have been paid out. This formulation has
only two such costs: the rental rate, ck,a n dt h ev a r i a b l ec o s t ,φn.39 T h ec h o i c eo fh o u r st h a t
solves the bargaining problem is still given by (8), and hence π(x)=y(x) − w(x), where
y(x) ≡ [max(x − φ,0) − c]k is output net of the variable cost and the rental on capital.
The values of unemployment and employment to a worker are
rU = b + θq(θ)
ZZ
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z|x)dH (x) (33)
rW (x)=w(x)+λ
Z
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z|x) − (δ + λ)[W (x) − U], (34)
39Here I model φn as a cost borne by the ﬁrm, but Appendix B shows that this formulation is equivalent to
one in which φn is instead the disutility the worker experiences from working n hours.
30where w(x) is still characterized by (9). Letting S (x)=J (x)+W (x) − U denote the surplus
from a match, notice that (9) implies J (x)=( 1 − β)S (x), W (x) − U = βS(x), π(x)=
(1 − β)[y(x) − rU] and
w(x)=βy(x)+( 1− β)rU. (35)
Combining (9) with (32), (33), and (34) yields
(r + δ + λ)S (x)=y(x) − rU + λ
Z
max[S (z),0]dG(z|x),
where rU is given by (10). The fact that S0 (x) > 0 implies that there exists a unique R such
that S (x) > 0 iﬀ x>R . Hence matches separate (or don’t form) for productivity draws
below R. Moreover, notice that S (x) is strictly increasing for all x (even for x<φ )d e s p i t e
the fact that y(x) is ﬂat for x<φ .T h i si sb e c a u s edG(·|x) is stochastically increasing in x.
Consequently, the equilibrium may have R>φ(no hoarding) for some parametrizations and
R<φ(hoarding) for others.40









if ε(s) ≤ x,
where ε(·) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function and α>1. I introduce positively correlated
shocks by assuming that ε0 > 0 (if ε0 =0the distribution reduces to (20), the special case of
uncorrelated shocks). In addition, suppose there is an ε > 0 such that ε(ε)=ε and ε(s)=0
if s<ε ,a n dt h a t lim
s→∞ε(s)=1+ε ≡ ε.41





; hence, for any x ≥ R, G(x|s) − G(R|s)=
[ε(s)/R]
α[1 − (R/x)
α]. After substituting these expressions in (30), it becomes clear that the
steady-state productivity distribution of active matches is still given by (21). So for this case,
40In trying to determine which parametrizations may exhibit hoarding, the logic of Figure 3 in Appendix B
also applies to this case.
41An example of a function ε(·) satisfying all these conditions is ε(s)=1+ε − e
ε−s for any ε > 0.






































An equilibrium is still a list [R,θ,H,U,w,u,K] such that R, θ,a n dH jointly solve (30) and
the job-creation and job-destruction conditions, rU is given by (10), w is given by (35), and
u satisﬁes (29). In addition, the market for capital should clear, so [1 − (1 − θ)u]k = K.
Suﬃcient conditions can be found so that the job-creation condition slopes downward and
the job-destruction condition slopes upward in θ-R space, implying a unique (θ,R) pair. A
parameter restriction analogous to the one depicted in Figure 3 in Appendix B which guarantees
that φ has a range of values such that R<φcan still be derived.42 Given the equilibrium pair
(θ,R), the same procedure followed in Section 4 reveals that output aggregates to (22). Thus,
the key aggregation result obtained in the context of the model of Section 2 does not hinge
on some of the particular modeling choices made there. In particular, allowing for correlated
shocks can generate hoarding, and there is no need for the ﬁx e dc o s to fS e c t i o n2 .
8.2 More on Aggregation
In this subsection I prove two additional aggregation results. First, I provide another speciﬁca-
tion of primitives that delivers the same aggregation result obtained for the models of Sections
2 and 8.1. Again, this speciﬁcation does not rely on the ﬁx e dc o s to fS e c t i o n2 ,s oi naw a y
it reinforces the message of Section 8.1. The second aggregation result shows how to reverse
engineer a distribution of idiosyncratic shocks that gives rise to an aggregate constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function.
42Showing that equilibria with R<φare possible for some parametrizations is now rather tedious, so the
basic idea is only outlined here. Let φε be the value of φ such that θ
∗
ε and R(φε)=ε solve the job-creation and
job-destruction conditions. Then if φε−ε>0, there will be an interval (φε,b φ) such that R(φ) <φiﬀ φ ∈ (φε,b φ).
If, in addition, ∂R(φ)/∂φ > 0,t h e nφε − ε>0 also implies ε<R(φ) for all φ. Finally, notice that R>ε also
implies that every match faces a positive probability of being destroyed for endogenous reasons. To see why,
suppose R =  <ε; then any match that reaches a state s>ε
−1 ( ) will never be destroyed endogenously.
32First consider the model of Section 2, but with C =0and separation rates that are de-
creasing in the productivity of the match; i.e., 0 <δ (x) < ∞ for all x,w i t hδ0 < 0.T h e
interpretation is that δ is a technological parameter: in any small time interval, with proba-
bility δ(x) the idiosyncratic productivity of the match jumps to zero and stays at that level
forever. I return to the case of uncorrelated productivity draws for the remainder of the section.
The distribution of active matches now evolves according to
d
dt
[(1 − ut)Ht(x)] = λ(1 − ut)[1− Ht(x)][G(x) − G(Rt)] + θq(θ)ut [G(x) − G(Rt)]





The value functions (5) and (7) are respectively replaced by
rW (x)=w(x)+λ
Z
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z) − [δ(x)+λ][W (x) − U]
rJ (x)=π(x)+λ
Z
max[J (z) − V,0]dG(z) − [δ(x)+λ][J (x) − V ],
while (4) and (6) remain unchanged. The bargaining outcome is still characterized by (8) and
(9), and the value functions imply
S (x)=





which is clearly increasing in x and has a kink at φ, as is usual when departing from the simple
ﬁxed-cost formulation of Section 2. Plotting S (x) reveals that, depending on parametrizations,
two cases are possible: the kink could be above or below the horizontal axis. If it is above, then
R<φand the equilibrium exhibits hoarding. The job-creation and job-destruction conditions
can be derived as usual, and an equilibrium can be summarized by the (θ,R) pair that solves
them. The following result provides conditions under which this model aggregates to (22), just
as in the models of Section 2 and 6.1.











33for x ≥ ε and dG(x)=0otherwise, where ε,δ,σ > 0,a n dα>1. T h e ni ne q u i l i b r i u m ,t h e
aggregates Y , Ke,a n dN satisfy (22).
So far I have shown that in several versions of the Mortensen—Pissarides model, for certain
distributions of the idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate output looks like a Cobb-Douglas function
of the aggregate labor and capital inputs. What follows generalizes the previous results by
characterizing the distribution of shocks that gives rise to an aggregate CES production function.














if ε ≤ x,
(37)
with ε>0 and ρ,σ ∈ (0,1).43 Substituting (37) into (3), one sees that for any R ≥ ε,t h e













if R ≤ x,a n dH (x)=0if x<R ,w i t hκ ≡ [1 − G(R)]
−1. Following a strategy similar to that
of Levhari (1968), one can establish the following result.
Proposition 4 If the primitive distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is given by (37), then




e +( 1− σ)Nρ¤1/ρ,w i t h
B = ε











In this case, all the characteristics of the labor market as summarized by R aﬀect the
measured productivity of inputs asymmetrically.44 Notice that as ρ → 0, (37) approaches the
Pareto distribution in (20) with parameters ε and α =1 /σ.S oi nt h i ss e n s e ,t h eC E Sa g g r e g a t e
in Proposition 4 approaches the Cobb-Douglas aggregate in (22) as the elasticity of substitution
1/(1 − ρ) approaches unity.45
43Under these conditions, G
0 (x) ≥ 0 and lim
x→∞G(x)=1 ,s oG is a proper cumulative distribution function.





e +( 1− σ)N
ρ]
1/ρ. However, no primitive density has (37) as its truncation.
45Notice, however, that the truncation of (37) does not approach (21) as ρ → 0. That is, even though the
349C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper developed a theory of TFP diﬀerences based on the interaction between institutions
and the microeconomics underlying the aggregate production function. The analysis focused on
a precise class of institutions, namely, labor-market policies as measured by the magnitudes of
hiring subsidies, employment subsidies, unemployment beneﬁts, and ﬁring taxes. In the model,
ﬁrm-level technologies are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that induce a cross-sectional distri-
bution of productivities. Through their eﬀects on job-creation and job-destruction decisions,
labor-market policies aﬀect the productivity composition of active ﬁrms–and ultimately TFP.
By thinking of the aggregate production function as an equilibrium relationship between
aggregate inputs and output arising from the aggregation of heterogeneous micro-level produc-
tion units, I was able to show analytically how the measured level of TFP–usually a “black
box” that drives cross-country income diﬀerences–depends on primitive technological parame-
ters, government policies, and other fundamental features of the economic environment. This
approach may prove useful in interpreting aggregate productivity data and can serve as a guide
to uncovering sources of cross-country diﬀerences in measured TFP.
primitive distribution approaches a Pareto, its truncation does not limit a truncated Pareto. This is because the
density in (37) is not “closed” under truncations (as, for example, the Pareto and the exponential distributions
are). This “discontinuity” introduced by the truncation is the reason why if we take the limit on the truncated
cumulative distribution function or on the CES aggregate directly, we don’t obtain exactly (22).
35A Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .












−cη (θ)(r + δ + λ)R
,
respectively, where τ (R)=R+α(r + δ + λ)(τh − τf). Note that for all R ≥ ε, the destruction
condition slopes upward and the creation condition slopes downward. If φ = φ , then (24) and
(25) have a unique solution, namely, θ(φ )=θ∗
  and R(φ )=ε. Increases in φ only shift
the destruction condition downward, increasing the equilibrium level of R and decreasing the
equilibrium level of θ (the creation condition is independent of φ). In addition, for any given
φ, the creation condition (25) asymptotes the horizontal axis in (R,θ) s p a c ea n dt h ej o b -
destruction condition (24) grows without bound. Therefore (a)-(d) follow for any φ>φ  .
Finally, φ  − ε>0 is equivalent to φ  − R(φ ) > 0, which implies (e).













.S i n c e τ (R) > 0 by Proposition 1, it follows



























and this concludes the proof.




















Verify that G(ε)=0and limx→∞ G(x)=1 . Under the parametric restrictions in the statement,
dG(x) ≥ 0 for all x,s odG is a proper density. The restriction α>1 ensures the mean is ﬁnite.
36Imposing steady states in (36), substituting (39) and solving for H (x) reveals that H (x) is as
in (21).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
The problem is to ﬁnd a cumulative distribution function H that satisﬁes H (R)=0and
yields
Y = a[σ1 (ˆ κKe)
ρ + σ2Nρ]
1/ρ , (40)
where ρ ∈ (0,1) and a, ˆ κ, σ1,a n dσ2 are positive constants. Deﬁne ς (x)=
R
x zh(z)dz and
s(x)=1− H (x). Since, in general, Y = ς (µ)Ke and N = s(µ)Ke, (40) can be rewritten
as ς (x)
ρ = aρ [σ1ˆ κρ + σ2s(x)
















,w h i c hb y
deﬁning
ε = σ2a(σ1 + σ2)
1−ρ














. The requirement that H (R)=0
implies that ˆ κ = κ (with κ as deﬁned in Subsection 6.2). After specifying that H (x)=0for
x<R , this expression is identical to (38). So by construction, aggregation under (38) yields
(40). And after letting ˆ κ = κ and making the substitutions in (41), one realizes that (40) is
identical to the aggregate in Proposition 4. Finally, verifying that (38) is the truncation of (37)
at R concludes the proof.



















































Without additional restrictions, the sign of ∂θ/∂τf is ambiguous. It is negative in any
equilibrium with φ>φ   if δ>r(1 − ε)/ε.
37B Appendix
Lemma 1 Let ϕ(R)=
R





r+δ+λϕ(0) − φ − c
i
.I f τb is small and
q(θ) > r+δ+λ
(1−β)ϕ(0)c, then there exists a unique pair (θ,R) ∈ R2
+ that solves (15) and (16).
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (15) and (16), respectively, gives
∂R
∂θ















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
JC
=
−(r + δ + λ)cη (θ)
(1 − β)θq(θ)[1− G(R)]
,
where η(θ) ≡− θq0 (θ)/q(θ) > 0. Notice that the job-creation condition is downward sloping
in (θ,R) space, whereas the job-destruction condition is upward sloping, provided τb is not too
big. To verify this, note that if τb ≈ 0, the slope of the job-destruction condition reduces to
∂R
∂θ










Therefore, as long as τb is small enough, if an intersection exists, it must be unique. To establish
existence, deﬁne








ˆ T (R,θ) ≡ ϕ(R) −
(r + δ + λ)c
(1 − β)q(θ)
.
The equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) are equivalent to T (R,θ)=0and ˆ T (R,θ)=0 ,




=0 , respectively. Since the θ
that satisﬁes (16) goes to 0 as R gets large, and the θ that satisﬁes (15) grows without bound






(1−β)ϕ(0)c,a n di fτb ≈ 0,t h e nθ is as in the statement of the lemma. Thus, the
condition θ < θ is equivalent to the parametric restriction q(θ) > r+δ+λ
(1−β)ϕ(0)c.
38Conditions for equilibrium labor hoarding.
Since, as mentioned at the end of Section 6.2, having ﬁrm-worker pairs that sometimes
choose to be inactive aﬀects the shape of the aggregates in interesting ways, here I verify that
it is indeed possible for the equilibrium of the basic model of Section 2 to exhibit this property.





































(1−β)ε and τb ≤ ¯ τb,w h e r e
¯ τb =
(α − 1)(r + δ)
βα(r + δ + λ)+( 1− β)(α − 1)(r + δ)
.
Then there exists a unique pair (θ,R) ∈ (0,∞) × (ε,∞) that satisﬁes (42) and (43).
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (42) and (43) gives
∂R
∂θ















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
JC
=




where η(θ) ≡− θq0 (θ)/q(θ) > 0. Thus the job-creation condition (43) is always downward
sloping in (θ,R) space, whereas the job-destruction condition (42) is upward sloping if τb ≤ ¯ τb.
So under this condition, if an intersection exists, it is unique. The parameter restriction q(θ) >
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)c
(1−β)ε guarantees that the two lines intersect on (0,∞) × (ε,∞).
39Since the aim now is merely to show that hoarding may arise in equilibrium, I set τb =0














−(1 − β)θq(θ)[1− G(R)]




where 1 − G(R)=( ε/R)
α and η(θ) ≡− θq0 (θ)/q (θ). An increase in φ has no direct eﬀect
on the job-creation condition, and it shifts the job-destruction condition upward in θ-R space.
This increases the equilibrium value of R and decreases the equilibrium value of θ. Combining
(42) and (43), one sees that the sign of φ − R is the sign of λ/q (θ) − [1 − (1 − θ)β].S o a t
low productivity realizations, the ﬁrm is more likely to hoard labor than to break the match
when λ is large (and hence the option value of keeping a match is large) and when q is small
(and hence the expected cost of hiring a new worker is high). Market tightness θ enters the
expression with an ambiguous sign because on the one hand, a large θ makes hoarding more
likely by increasing the expected recruiting cost; but on the other hand, through its eﬀect on
the worker’s reservation wage, it also increases the value of her threat point in the wage bargain,
which makes keeping an unproductive worker employed more costly and hoarding less likely. In
fact, the latter eﬀect disappears if the worker has no power in the wage bargain (i.e., if β =0 ).
Next, I derive a condition on parameters that is suﬃcient for R<φin equilibrium.
Let θ∗
ε be deﬁned by q(θ∗
ε)=
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)c













Then if φ = φε, the versions of (42) and (43) with τb =0are solved by θ(φε)=θ∗
ε and
R(φε)=ε. Notice that if R(φε)=ε<φ ε, then there is a nondegenerate interval [φε,φ R) such
that R(φ) <φiﬀ φ ∈ [φε,φ R). An example of the function R(φ) is illustrated in Figure 2.
So a suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium to exhibit hoarding for at least some range of
46Just as for the existence and uniqueness results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Appendix B, the results that
follow will also hold for replacement rates τb that are not too big. The algebra gets cumbersome with τb > 0
because under this speciﬁcation, unemployment income b is a function of the equilibrium distribution of wages
earned.
40Figure 2: Destruction decision as a function of the variable cost
the parameter φ is that φε − ε>0, or equivalently, that T (λ,ζ) > 0, where
T (λ,ζ) ≡
λε










The parameter ζ summarizes the eﬃciency of matching, with the property that ∂m(u,v)/∂ζ >
0 and hence that ∂q(θ)/∂ζ > 0 for all θ. Figure 3 plots the boundary T (λ,ζ)=0in λ-ζ space.
The condition φε −ε>0 is satisﬁed for the values of the parameters λ and ζ that lie below
the boundary.47 Intuitively, the parameter restriction that makes hoarding possible holds for
relatively large λ (i.e., when bad shocks are very transitory) and relatively low ζ (i.e., when the
search process needed to replace the worker is very costly).
47Note that θ
∗
ε goes to zero as ζ goes to zero. So T (λ,0) = 0 iﬀ λ = λ0,w h e r eλ0 ≡
c(α−1)(r+δ)
ε−c(a−1) is the point














ε) > 0. The equilibrium may or may not
exhibit hoarding for parametrizations that lie above the boundary.
41Figure 3: Range of parameters for which there is hoarding
The model of Section 2 with a general ﬁxed cost.
The value functions are still given by (4), (5), (6), and (7), but the proﬁt function is now
π(x)=xmin(n,k) − w(x) − ck − φn − C (x)k,
where C (x) is continuous and C0 < 0 (the inequality need only be strict for x<φ ). The
bargaining problem is unchanged, and hours are still given by (8), so
π(x) = [max(x − φ,0) − c − C (x)]k − w(x).
Also from the Nash bargaining, wages are
w(x)=β [max(x − φ,0) − c − C (x)]k +( 1− β)rU, (45)
and therefore ﬂow proﬁts are
π(x)=( 1− β){[max(x − φ,0) − c − C (x)]k − rU}. (46)
Steps similar to the ones that led to (14) now imply
S (x)=
max(x − φ,0) − max(R − φ,0) + C (R) − C (x)
r + δ + λ
k. (47)
42Note that if the idiosyncratic technology shock does not induce savings in the ﬁxed cost
(i.e., if either C (x)=0for all x or C0 =0 ), then (47) reduces to (r + δ + λ)S (x)=
[max(x − φ,0) − max(R − φ,0)]k. From this it is clear that the expected surplus S (x) is
ﬂat for x<φ , meaning that generically, R>φin an equilibrium with endogenous destruction.
(The reservation R is indeterminate in the interval [0,φ] in the knife-edge case in which the
ﬂat spot coincides with the horizontal axis.) Conversely, C0 < 0 ensures that S (x) is strictly
increasing for all x, and therefore the level R for which S (R)=0may be to the right or to the
left of φ, depending on the parametrization. In general, S (x) will have a kink at x = φ,b u t
this is immaterial for my purposes. The job-destruction condition for this case is





r + δ + λ
ˆ ϕ(R)=0 , (48)




[max(x − φ,0) − max(R − φ,0) + C (R) − C (x)]dG(x).
The job-creation condition is
ˆ ϕ(R) −
(r + δ + λ)c
(1 − β)q(θ)
=0 . (49)
If one speciﬁes the unemployment income by b = τbk as in Section 5, it is immediate that
(48) is increasing and (49) decreasing in (θ,R) space, so they will intercept exactly once under









r+δ+λˆ ϕ(R)=0 , (50)
where ˆ E (R) ≡ [1 − G(R)]
−1 R
R [max(x − φ,0) − C (x)]dG(x). For this formulation, condi-
tions analogous to the ones in Lemma 2 (essentially a replacement rate τb that is not “too big”)
will guarantee existence and uniqueness of a pair (θ,R) that satisﬁes (49) and (50). Given the
equilibrium (θ,R), the aggregation proceeds exactly as in Section 4.
43Reinterpreting the variable cost φn as disutility from work.
Instead of assuming there is a variable cost of production φn as in Section 2, now suppose
there is no such cost, but instead the worker suﬀers disutility φn if she supplies n hours to the
ﬁrm. The value functions (4), (6), and (7) remain unchanged, whereas (5) is now
rW (x)=w(x) − φn + λ
Z
max[W (z) − U,0]dG(z) − (δ + λ)[W (x) − U]. (51)
The ﬁrm’s ﬂow proﬁti sm o d i ﬁed accordingly to π (x)=xmin(n,k) − w(x) − ck − C (x)k.48
The bargaining solution implies a choice of hours that is still characterized by (8). Naturally,
regardless of which party bears the cost φn,t h ee ﬃcient bargaining solution will ensure the
eﬃc i e n tn u m b e ro fh o u r sw o r k e da n dw i l lu s et h ew a g ew(x) to distribute the surplus among
the partners. In fact, since W (x) is now given by (51), the ﬁrst-order condition (9) now yields
w(x)=φn + β [max(x − φ,0) − c − C (x)]k +( 1− β)rU (52)
π(x)=( 1 − β){[max(x − φ,0) − c − C (x)]k − rU}, (53)
where rU still satisﬁes (10). The outcome is that regardless of who suﬀers the production cost
φn, the worker and ﬁrm share it so that the ﬁrm bears a fraction 1 − β. In fact, comparing
(53) with (46) conﬁrms that the ﬁrm’s ﬂow proﬁt is unchanged when φn is modeled in this way.
Similarly, note that the worker’s value function is also unchanged in this formulation relative
to the variable cost interpretation. This can be veriﬁed by checking that substituting (52) into
(51) delivers the same expression for the worker’s value function as substituting (45) into (5).
Derivation of the equilibrium conditions for the model with labor-market policies.
In the model of Section 5, there are two reasons why the bargaining situation faced by a
ﬁrm and a worker when they ﬁrst meet and are still considering whether to form a match is
diﬀerent from the one they face every instant after having agreed to form the match. The ﬁrst
is that in the initial bargain, a one-time hiring subsidy is at stake. The second is that at that
48The ﬁxed cost C (x)k could be set to zero here. This, however, is of no consequence for the purposes of
reinterpreting φn as a disutility cost from work.
44point, the ﬁrm is not yet “locked in” by the ﬁring tax. I use wo (x) to denote the wage that
solves the initial bargain and w(x) to denote the subsequent wage. Accordingly, Jo (x) and
Wo (x) are the value functions for the ﬁrm and worker in the instant they form a new match
and satisfy Wo (x) − W (x)=J (x) − Jo (x)=wo (x) − w(x).
The wages wo (x) and w(x) are characterized by
β [Jo (x)+τhk]=( 1− β)[Wo (x) − U] and β [J (x)+τfk]=( 1− β)[W (x) − U],
where the equilibrium condition V =0has already been imposed. Letting So (x)=Jo (x)+
Wo (x)+τhk−U and S (x)=J (x)+W (x)+τfk−U be the initial and the subsequent surpluses,
respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply that Wo (x) − U = βSo (x), W (x) − U = βS(x),
Jo (x)+τhk =( 1− β)So (x),a n dJ (x)+τfk =( 1− β)S (x). Combining these with the value
functions gives
(r + δ + λ)S (x)=( x − φ − c)k + τek + rτfk − rU + λ
Z
max[S (z),0]dG(z),
with rU as in (10). Since S0 (x) > 0, there is a unique R such that S (x) ≥ 0 iﬀ x ≥ R.U s i n g
this reservation property, the surplus of an ongoing match can be written as




a natural generalization of (11). One can work with the value functions and the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the Nash problem to derive expressions for wages and proﬁt.49 Evaluating (54)




S (z)dG(z)=rU − [(R − φ − c)k + τek + rτfk],
and substituting this back into (54) yields (14). Using (14) to substitute S (z) out of (54),
evaluating at x = R and using (10) produces the job-destruction condition:









r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x − R)dG(x)=0 .
49The wages and proﬁt in ongoing matches are given by w(x)=β (x − φ − c + τe + rτf)k +( 1− β)rU
and π(x)=( 1 − β)[(x − φ − c)k − rU] − β (τe + rτf)k, whereas those agreed upon in an initial match are
wo (x)=w(x)+β (r + δ + λ)(τh − τf)k and πo (x)=π(x) − β (r + δ + λ)(τh − τf)k. All matches still set
hours according to (8).
45Increases in the employment subsidy and the ﬁring tax reduce R for given θ.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
an increase in τe or τf shifts the job-destruction condition downward in θ-R space. Conversely,
an increase in τb raises the worker’s outside option and hence increases R for given θ.







Note that So (x)=S (x)+( τh − τf)k, so in the presence of ﬁring and hiring policies, the
reservation strategy used for match formation, say Ro,m a yd i ﬀer from R,t h eo n eu s e df o r
match dissolution. However, there are several speciﬁcations for the hiring subsidy and the
destruction tax under which Ro = R, and the analysis will focus on this subset of policies
hereafter.50 Then, (55) becomes
R
R So (x)dG(x)= ck





r + δ + λ




With G as in (20), the job-destruction and job-creation conditions specialize to (24) and (25).
Steady-state distribution of productivities for the model of Section 7.
Lemma 3 The steady-state distribution of productivities for the model in which initial produc-
tivity draws are from G0 (x)=1−
¡ε0
x




ε0 > 0 and subsequent draws are from (20), is given by (21).














50The simplest example of one such policy is the self-ﬁnancing policy that sets τh = τf for all values of the
idiosyncratic productivity draw x. But more generally, a policy specifying τh = τf for all realizations x ≤ R
and τh >τ f for all x>Rwould also imply Ro = R. Note that a policy that merely speciﬁes τh >τ f for all
x will be abused by ﬁrms and workers in the sense that since Ro <R ,aﬁrm-worker pair that meets and draws
x ∈ (Ro,R] will want to form a match only for an instant to collect (τh − τf)k and destroy it right away (since
right after collecting from the government, their break up decision is given by R). Yet another set of policies
delivering Ro = R is having τf >τ h =0but assuming τf is enforced from the very instant the ﬁrm-worker pair
meet and start bargaining, which implies wo (x)=w(x), since in this case the ﬁrm is “locked in” by the ﬁring
tax upon meeting the worker.
46which generalizes the expression right above (2). In this model, (2) generalizes to
u =
δ + λG(R)
δ + λG(R)+θq(θ)[1− G0 (R)]
,
and using this to substitute u/(1 − u) from the expression for H yields
H (x)=
λ[1−G0(R)][G(x)−G(R)]+[δ+λG(R)][G0(x)−G0(R)]
(δ+λ)[1−G0(R)][G(x)−G(R)] [G(x) − G(R)]. (56)
Substituting the parametric expressions for G0 and G in the ﬁrst factor reveals that it equals
(ε/R)
−α, but this is just [1 − G(R)]
−1, so (56) can be written as (3) or, given the Pareto
assumption, as (21).
Sensitivity of the quantitative results.
Table 2 reports results for α =1 .1, a value that implies the distribution of output in the
model is close to satisfying Zipf’s law. For this case, the values of the calibrated parameters
are λ =1 .2, φ =1 .13, ε0 =0 .34,a n dτb =1 .15. In the equilibrium, R =1 .08.T h em e a n so f
the distributions G and G0 are 11 and 3.73, respectively. The average wage is ¯ w =1 0 .47.T h e
responses to policy are extremely large. For instance, an increase in unemployment beneﬁts of
one-tenth of 1% increases TFP as measured by A by 4.5%, and decreases it by 30% according
to ˆ A and by 32% according to ˜ A.
τi/¯ wD u A τi/A0 ˆ Aτi/ ˆ A0 ˜ Aτi/ ˜ A0 H (φ)
baseline 0.110 10 0.069 1 1 1 0.050
τb 1.210 0.111 7 0.106 1.045 0.696 0.674 0.003
1.109 0.109 17 0.040 0.967 1.585 1.655 0.085
τf 0.015 0.001 12 0.055 0.984 1.210 1.231 0.067
0.025 0.002 16 0.045 0.973 1.425 1.473 0.078
τe 0.015 0.001 12 0.059 0.988 1.141 1.155 0.062
0.025 0.002 13 0.052 0.981 1.263 1.291 0.070
τh 0.015 0.001 8 0.082 1.015 0.863 0.852 0.034
0.025 0.002 7 0.090 1.025 0.795 0.778 0.023
Table 2: Parametrization with α =1 .1
Table 3 reports results for α =3 . The values of the calibrated parameters are λ =1 .28,
φ =1 .045, ε0 =0 .9,a n dτb =0 .05. In the equilibrium, R =1 .027. The means of the
47distributions G and G0 are 1.5 and 1.34, respectively. The average wage is ¯ w =0 .47.T h e
eﬀects are now smaller than those in Table 1. For example, increasing the replacement rate
from 11% to 12% increases TFP as measured by A by only half a percentage point. With TFP
measured by ˆ A and ˜ A, this policy implies a reduction of 2.4% and 6%, respectively.
τi/¯ wD u A τi/A0 ˆ Aτi/ ˆ A0 ˜ Aτi/ ˜ A0 H (φ)
baseline 0.11 10 0.069 1 1 1 0.050
τb 0.058 0.12 8 0.082 1.005 0.976 0.940 0.035
0.049 0.10 11 0.063 0.997 1.012 1.033 0.057
τf 0.005 0.01 13 0.054 0.994 1.033 1.091 0.067
0.010 0.02 18 0.039 0.988 1.073 1.211 0.084
τe 0.005 0.01 12 0.058 0.996 1.022 1.059 0.062
0.010 0.02 14 0.047 0.991 1.047 1.130 0.074
τh 0.005 0.01 8 0.083 1.006 0.972 0.929 0.034
0.010 0.02 7 0.096 1.011 0.949 0.871 0.018
Table 3: Parametrization with α =3
Table 4 reports results for an alternative calibration strategy, namely keeping η =0 .72 but
calibrating β jointly with (λ,ε0,τb,φ) so that the model also reproduces a labor share of 0.66
when all of the ﬁrm proﬁt is imputed as capital income. The value of α is set to 1.15.T h ev a l u e s
of the calibrated parameters are β =0 .1, λ =0 .255, φ =1 .611, ε0 =0 .267,a n dτb =0 .6947.
In the equilibrium, R =1 .541. The means of the distributions G and G0 are 7.67 and 2.05,
respectively. The average wage is ¯ w =6 .316.
τi/¯ wD u A τi/A0 ˆ Aτi/ ˆ A0 ˜ Aτi/ ˜ A0 H (φ)
baseline 0.11 10 0.069 1 1 1 0.050
τb 0.770 0.12 9 0.077 1.044 0.945 0.938 0.002
0.630 0.10 11 0.062 0.963 1.059 1.067 0.091
τf 0.650 0.10 12 0.053 0.918 1.170 1.195 0.139
1.250 0.20 16 0.035 0.824 1.543 1.639 0.239
τe 0.075 0.01 11 0.061 0.957 1.069 1.079 0.097
0.320 0.05 17 0.033 0.818 1.522 1.613 0.246
τh 0.075 0.01 10 0.070 1.008 0.987 0.985 0.041
0.320 0.05 9 0.075 1.033 0.950 0.944 0.013
Table 4: Alternative calibration strategy
48A 1% increase in the replacement ratio increases TFP as measured by A by 4.4%.I n t r o -
ducing ﬁring taxes equivalent to 10% of the average wage reduces A by 8.9%. This policy also
reduces the unemployment rate and increases the labor share to 0.71. (It increases the labor
share because the lower unemployment rate puts the worker in a stronger bargaining position
vis-à-vis the ﬁrm.) According to ˆ A and ˜ A,t h i sﬁring tax increases TFP by 17% and 19.5%,
respectively. A 1% employment subsidy reduces TFP as measured by A by 4.3%, but increases
it according to ˆ A and ˜ A,b y6.9% and 7.9%, respectively. The policy reduces unemployment,
which increases the labor share to 0.696.
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